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Summary  findings
Baqir considers  the overspending  bias  in legislatures  His main findings  are that:
when the benefits  of public  policies  are concentrated  in  *  If we take an average  city, keep its population  and
particular  districts  but the costs  of financing  them are  other characteristics  constant, but divide  it into a greater
spread  over the entire political  jurisdiction.  He  number  of political  districts,  we get substantially  greater
formalizes this idea in a simple theoretic framework, in  government spending per capita.
the context of externalities  between  districts.  *  Greater jurisdictional  heterogeneity  and income
His main prediction  is that greater  districting  leads  to  equality  are associated  with bigger  government.
bigger  government,  but the effects  are mitigated  if there  *  At-large  electoral  systems  are not less  sensitive  to
are positive  spillovers  of government  spending  between  overspending  than district  electoral  systems  are.
districts.  *  Strong-mayor  forms  of city  government,  especially
Institutional  forms  of government  that concentrate  those in which mayors  have  veto power, can curtail the
decisionmaking  power can curtail  the overspending  bias.  overspending  bias.
He presents  evidence  on these  predictions  from a cross-  These  findings  are robust  to controlling  for
section  of U.S.  city governments.  socioeconomic  characteristics  of cities and to alternative
measures  of government  size.
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In recent  years  an interesting  political  economy  literature  has developed  to explain
the size and fiscal performance  of government.  A central  feature of this literature
is the prominence  given  to the role of distributive  politics. By distributive  politics
is meant  the politics of policies  which  produce  benefits  which are concentrated  to
a particular  group of people  and costs which  are disbursed  over the entire  political
jurisdiction. Pork-barrel  projects  are a prime example  of such politics where  the
projects produce benefits for one geographical community and are financed
through taxation on  the  entire population of the  political jurisdiction.  As
discussed  extensively in Weingast,  Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) such politics
leads to a bias towards bigger project size and, in general,  bigger government.
The effect arises because legislators,  when making their spending  proposals  for
government projects, do not internalize the  complete consequences  of their
proposals  on other residents  of the political  jurisdiction. Acting  on the behalf of
the residents  of their district  they  fully value  the benefits  accruing  to population  in
their district  but bear only a fraction  of the cost of the project.' At a more general
level the overspending  bias arises due to districting  and generalized  taxation.
Other recent papers in which the same basic channel  affects fiscal performance
include Velasco (1997), Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997), Chari and Cole
(1993a,b),  and Chari,  Jones and  Marimon  (1994).
A central  prediction  that emerges  from  this class of models  is that greater  the
number  of districts,  greater  is the over-spending  bias, and hence greater  the size of
government.  The purpose  of this paper  is to test this and related  predictions  from
a cross-section  of city governments  in the U.S.  These governments exhibit
substantial  variation in both their fiscal outcomes and political structures  and
constitute  a good  data-set  for testing  theories  relating  political  institutions  to fiscal
outcomes.  These data have the additional  virtue that cities share a common
This is also referred to as the "common pool" problem in the literature  on environmental
economics.national institutional set-up and problems in inference arising out of unobserved
or unquantifiable  historical and  institutional  factors, which  in  general  plague
cross-country  studies,  are  likely  to  be  less.  I  present  a  simple  theoretical
framework to  formalize the overspending bias  in  the  context  of  externalities
between districts. The model relates per capita government spending in a political
jurisdiction to the number of districts (alternatively, the size of the legislature) and
to a measure of the externalities of government expenditure between districts and
predicts that (i) districting and (ii) greater jurisdictional heterogeneity raise the
scale  of  government  expenditures. 2 The  central  empirical  findings  can  be
summarized as follows.
First, there is strong evidence that, controlling for city population and other
characteristics, bigger  city  councils  and  greater  heterogeneity  amongst  city
residents leads to considerably greater local government expenditures per capita.
Extensive  sensitivity  analysis  of  the  baseline  results-by  including  possible
omitted variables, state-specific effects, and sample-splits, as well as instrumental
variables estimations to address potential concerns of endogeneity-indicates  that
the finding is fairly robust. The findings are also robust to alternative measures of
the size of govermment  I use: share of total government expenditures in total city
income and local government employment per capita.  The results indicate that if
we keep the population of an average city constant but add one more councilman
to the city council, (s)he adds  somewhere between $15 to  $40 of government
expenditures per capita.  For the average sized city in the sample this amounts to
an addition of $0.46 - $1.20 million to the city budget-an  effect of considerable
magnitude. 3 The findings have substantial implications for  the importance of
institutional mechanisms to control the tendency for over-spending in legislatures.
2 For the moment  I shall  use the terms number  of districts  and council  size interchangeably.  The
two  need  not be the same  when  there  are multi-member  districts,  as in at-large  electoral  systems  in
cities. I discuss  this distinction  in greater  detail in section  4.
3  The median city budget for the sample is $17.5 million.  The effects are estimated from
regressions  corresponding  to the regressions  in  tables  3 and 4 where  the reported  coefficients  give
a lower  and  upper  bound  on the magnitude  of the effect  of council  size on government  size.
2Second, I  investigate how different electoral  systems  affect  government
spending.  The three predominant forms of electoral systems used in US cities are
district  (or  ward) systems, at-large systems,  and  mixed  systems where  some
councilmen are elected by district and some at-large. 4 It is commonly believed
that at-large systems, compared to district systems, can help to curtail pork-barrel
type spending by inducing councilmen to treat the entire city as their constituency.
If at-large councilmen did cater to the good of the entire city the asymmetry in
sharing the benefits and costs of public expenditures would be removed and the
overspending  bias  would  disappear.  The  evidence  I  find  contradicts  this
commonly held view.  At-large cities are not less susceptible to pork-barrel type
spending than district cities.  Many cities  in recent years have adopted mixed
electoral systems in an effort to try to capture the best elements of both district
and at-large systems.  Results for these cities indicate that  the effects of both
district  and  at-large  councilmen  are  slightly  exacerbated  in  mixed  electoral
systems.  One interpretation which these results admit is that in addition to the
externalities which councilmen impose on each other within a group there are also
inter-group externalities which they fail to  internalize, hence  leading to  worse
outcomes than either pure district or at-large systems.
Given  that  an  overspending bias  may  arise  in  legislatures,  and,  more
importantly, that ex post each legislator may prefer a coordinated outcome that
entails less spending for all, a central question which emerges is what political
institutions, if any, can we put into place to achieve better  outcomes.  Recent
literature in the area of budget institutions-the  study of how the rules  of the
game surrounding the budgetary process affects fiscal outcomes-indicates  that
political institutions which centralize decision-making authority in one figure in
the government, as for instance the in the president of a presidential government
system or the finance minister in a strong party parliamentary system, can help to
'  The multi-member  at-large  electoral  systems  in cities are not to be confused  with proportional
representation.  The only city which uses proportional representation in  city elections is
Cambridge,  MA.
3alleviate the overspending bias.  A strong finance minister  can internalize the
externalities inherent  in  spending  proposals of  the  individual  legislators  and
enforce  discipline  on  the  legislature,  leading  to  better  budgetary  outcomes
(smaller deficits,  quicker adjustment to  an  adverse shock)  and  in  general  to
smaller  government expenditures.  The third  contribution of  this  paper  is to
present  related  evidence  on  this  point  by  exploiting  the  variation  in  the
institutional form of city governments in the U.S.  City governments in the U.S.
come in two predominant institutional forms: (i) the Mayor-Council form, where
the city mayor is elected directly from the city population and is the head of the
executive branch of the government and (ii) the Council-Manager form where the
legislative and executive function of government is fused into the city council
which  may  appoint  a  city  manager  to  manage  the  day-to-day  affairs of  the
government.  The  relevant  difference  between  the  two  is  that  the  former
concentrates powers in the city mayor who cannot be fired by the city council and
can therefore exert independent influence on the city council.  In addition, cities
vary  considerably  in  how much power they  concentrate  in  their  mayors,  for
instance by giving them agenda setting powers and veto powers.  To the extent
that  city  governments  are political jurisdictions  which  make  fiscal  decisions
affecting government spending in their jurisdiction, and given that they vary in
their political institutions and form of government, we should be able to test for
predictions  of  theory  from  city  government  decisions.  Using  data  on  the
institutional form of city governments I examine how political institutions affect
fiscal outcomes.  The findings indicate that there is some evidence that Mayor-
council forms of government, particularly those which give mayors strong veto
powers, can act to  sever the link between council-size and legislature size-the
central prediction of the common-pool class of models-and  can help to curtail
the overspending bias in government.
The plan of the paper is as follows.  The next section briefly discusses the
most closely related papers.  Section 3 presents a simple theoretical framework in
which we can consider how districting and spillovers affect government spending.
4Section 4 describe the variables used in the empirical work and the sources of the
data.  Results  are  presented  in  section  5  and  the  last  section  concludes by
discussing future research.
2.  Related Literature
This paper fits in the literature on the relationship between political institutions
and fiscal outcomes.  On the theory side this paper is closest in spirit to the recent
strand of this  literature which has  looked at the question of how the political
institutions surrounding the budget making process (number of players, rules of
the game by which they interact, etc.) affect budgetary outcomes: expenditures,
deficits, and government debt.  The papers closest in spirit are Weingast, Shepsle
and Johnsen (1981), Velasco (1997), Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997), and Chari
and Cole (1993a, b).  The mechanism at the heart of many of these papers is the
common-pool type framework considered here.  Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen
(1981) consider this problem extensively in the context of a legislature deciding
the size of a public project under very general taxation schemes.  Velasco (1997)
presents a intertemporal model where a common-pool problem leads to a deficit
bias and an "endogenous" delay in adoption of stabilization policies.  Hallerberg
and von Hagen (1997) have a different set-up but get the  same type of result:
because of the common pool problem budget deficits are greater than those which
would be chosen by a social planner.  In this paper I add one feature to the basic
story: the role of externalities of government spending between districts. 5 I find
that when there are positive spillovers of governnent  spending between districts,
as in  a homogeneous jurisdiction  where each district wants  the  same type of
public expenditures, the common-pool problem is mitigated.  Using data on ethnic
heterogeneity in cities to proxy for the extent to which city residents benefit from
spillovers of government spending I test this prediction of the model.  I also focus
S The importance  of spillovers  of government  spending  is particularly  relevant for my purposes
since  I use local  government  data where  there  are likely  to be spillovers  between  city  districts.
5in  this  paper  on  the predictions  for  government  size  (as  opposed  to  budget
balance). Although I plan to look at intertemporal issues in future work, the focus
here on the size of expenditures helps to fill a gap in the literature.  In their review
of the literature on budget institutions, Persson and Tabellini (1998) note that
most of the empirical literature has looked at intertemporal fiscal policy choices,
such as deficits and debt, and "less attention has been devoted to implications for
the size of government" (p. 60).  They go on to comment "[t]his is an unfortunate
omission, as one of the underlying problems 'stricter'  budgetary procedures are
supposed to solve, namely, the soft budget constraint problem, also distorts the
level of spending." This paper goes towards filling this gap.
On the empirical side most  studies looking at how budgetary institutions
impact fiscal outcomes have relied  on cross-country and  U.S.  state data. 6 The
general approach in these papers, particularly the cross-country studies, has been
to  construct  indices which  measure the  degree  to  which  the  budget-making
process may be  fragmented and  subject to  pressures by  individual legislators,
ministers, or political parties in coalition governments. 7 While the papers differ
with respect to specific details, a common overall theme in this literature is that
institutions  which  centralize  decision-making  authority  lead  to  budgetary
outcomes which entail smaller deficits and quicker adjustment to adverse shocks. 8
6 For the cross-county  literature  relevant  papers  include  Roubini  and Sachs  (1989a,b),  Von Hagen
(1992),  Von Hagen  and Harden  (1994), Alesina  et. al. (1996), Hallerberg  and von Hagen  (1997),
and Kontopoulos  and Perotti (1998). The last of these cited papers  is the most comprehensive
study  to date in this area using  cross-country  data. For state-level  studies  see for instance  Poterba
(1994),  Alt and  Lowry  (1994),  Bayoumi  and Eichengreen  (1995)  and Bohn  and Inman  (1995).
7 In a different  empirical  approach,  Inman  and Fitts  (1990)  test the predictions  of a common  pool
model  using  time  series  data for federal  expenditures  revenues  for the U.S. for the period 1795  to
1988. Although  they  do not pose  the direct  test of the relationship  between  the number  of districts
and government  size,  their findings  are in general  in the same  vein  as the results  presented  here.
'  The terminology  Alesina and Perotti (1996) use in their review of the budget institutions
literature  is that of hierarchical  and collegial  institutions.  The former  have the property  that  they
limit  the democratic  accountability  of the budget process-by for instance  limiting  the authority
of the legislature  to amend the budget proposed by the  government-and attribute strong
prerogatives  to the Prime Minister (or the Finance,  or Treasury  Minister)  to overrule  spending
ministers  within  intra  govemmental  negotiations.  Collegial  institutions  have the opposite  property
and emphasize  the democratic  rule in every stage. They argue that there is a tradeoff between
these two types of institutions. Hierarchical  institutions,  in relation  to collegial  institutions,  are
more  likely  to promote  fiscal  restraint  and  avoid  large  and persistent  budget  deficits  but they  are
6This paper adds to the existing empirical literature in the following ways.  First, I
use a sample of local governments in the U.S. which allows me to greatly increase
the  degrees of  freedom  and  complements  our  set  of  findings  pertaining  to
countries  and  states.  Second,  I  focus  on  providing  evidence  on  a  central
prediction of common-pool which has not received much attention: the effect of
districting on  government size.  Common-pool type models make two  central
predictions: (i) greater is the number of districts and (ii) more decentralized is the
decision-making process in the legislature, worse is the collective outcome.  Most
empirical  studies  have looked at how centralization  of  the budget  institution
affects the outcome but the related prediction on the effect  of the number of
players has not been systematically explored.  One reason for this omission may
be that direct tests of this relationship from cross-county or cross-state data are
difficult since budgets at the national level are drafted by committees or cabinets
and then are submitted for approval to the full legislature.  In the absence of an
explicit theoretical model of these institutions it is unclear whether by the number
of districts we should mean the number of seats in the entire house, the number of
members  in  the  federal cabinet (or  the  number  of  members  of  the  relevant
committee),  the  number  of  political  parties  in  the  government,  or  some
combination of the three. 9 However, we can exploit the variation in the number of
districts across U.S. city governments to test this prediction.  City councils are
relatively cabinet- and committee-free.  They can thus offer a rather clean test of
the relationship between districting and government size.  Testing from a cross-
section of cities in the U.S. also has the advantage that all these cities are in the
same overall institutional environment of the U.S.  There is  likely to  be  less
also  more likely  to be less  respectful  of the rights  of minorities  and are likely  to generate  budgets
which  are heavily  tilted  in  the interests  of the majority.
9  Kontopoulos  and Perotti (1998) look at the issue of the number of players as well as the
fragmentation  of the budgetary  process  in affecting  fiscal  outcomes. They  measure  the number  of
players alternatively  as the number of political parties in a coalition government  and as the
number  of spending  ministries  in a government. Using  panel data on 20 OECD  countries  for the
period 1960-95  they find that  the number  of players  matters  for fiscal  outcomes-consistent with
the results  in this paper-but get some  variation  in which  measure  matters:  for the 1  970s  they find
that  the number  of spending  ministries  matters  while for the 1980s  the number  of parties  matters.
7variation in unobserved institutions when we look across cities in  one country
than across countries in the world.  Finally, I provide evidence on a  question
which has not  yet received researchers' attention:  how does  a city's  electoral
system affect the extent of the overspending bias in the legislatures?  Given that
cities vary in the methods by which they elect councilmen this is a question that
we can suitably explore with the data at hand.
3.  Theoretical Framework
Consider a  political jurisdiction with  J > 1 districts.  Each district  elects one
representative in the legislator so that there are J representatives in the legislature.
Representative j  maximizes the utility of  a representative constituent from his
district.'0 The utility function of the  representative constituent  from  the j-th
district-alternatively  the objective function  for  the j-th  representative  in  the
legislature-takes  the quasi-linear fonn,
u, = c  + v(a,g,  +,8,g,)  v'(.)  > O,v"(.)  < °  (1)
where cj denotes private consumption, g,  is government expenditures in district
j,  g  ,  denotes aggregate spending in all other districts,  3, = '-a'  and where I let
a,  e[+  ,I] . In this formulation, the representative agent in districtj  derives utility
from a weighted average of government expenditures in his own as well as other
districts.  More specifically he puts a weight a  on spending in his own district
and a weight  (1 - a,)  / (J - 1) on spending in each of the other  J - 1  districts.
The ,B's are set to prevent any scale effects.  The parameter a,  allows us to vary
the extent of spillovers between districts:  aj  = 1  corresponds to the case where
residents of district j  derive utility from spending only in their own district and
0 Note that the politics of running for election  has intentionally  been suppressed  here.  It is
assumed  that  the incumbent  representative  from districtj is re-election  motivated  and simply  tries
to maximize  the utility  of a representative  agent  from  his district.
8a,  =  I corresponds to the case where the agents put equal weight on all districts.
Note  two  things  about this  formulation.  First,  all  other  districts are  treated
equally, that  is, the same weight  i
6j  is put  on spending in  each  of the  other
districts, and second that districts may vary in how much they care for the others.
The parameter  aj  can also be thought of as index of heterogeneity in the
jurisdiction anid indeed this is the interpretation I push in the empirical section
below.  The idea is that different districts may have different preferences over the
type of government expenditures they may prefer.  Since other districts like some
other type of public good you discount the spending in that district to you.  How
much you discount depends on how dissimilar your preferences are for the desired
type of public expenditures.  If all districts want the same tvpe of expenditures-a
homogeneous jurisdiction-all  you care about is the jurisdiction-wide per capita
spending, putting equal weight on expenditures in each district (a=,  V j).
On the other hand, if residents of different districts have differing preferences over
which  activities they  want their  tax  dollars spent  on-a  more  heterogeneous
jurisdiction-they  would put greater weight on their desired type of expenditure
in their district and less on expenditures in other districts (higher  a1 's).  One
dimension along which preferences for local public goods may differ is race and
ethnicity.  A jurisdiction which is more ethnically heterogeneous would therefore
be associated with districts which put less weight on expenditures in each others
districts-high  a,  's.  In the empirical work I use an index of racial heterogeneity
of the city to proxy for a.  Since debates in urban politics, particularly over the
size and allocation of budget, often coalesce along ethnic lines, focusing on racial
heterogeneity as  the relevant dimension along which  preferences  for types  of
expenditures may differ is not inappropriate."
" In addition,  dissimilarity  in preferences  on public  expenditures  may also be based on income.
In the empirical  work I also control  for income  inequality  although  the variable  I use-ratio  of the
mean  to median  household  income-is more  readily  interpreted  in the Meltzer  and Richard  (1981)
type  redistributive  spending  framework.
9Without loss of generality we normalize the population size of each district
to  unity.  The variable  g,  therefore conveniently denotes both per  capita and
aggregate public spending in district j.  The public expenditure is financed by a
lump-sum per capita tax levied equally on all districts.' 2 Letting t denote the
amount  of  tax  per  capita,  and  yj  the  amount  of  pre-tax  income  of  the
representative  agent  in  district  j,  private  consumption  is  y,-t  and  the
jurisdiction's  budget balance condition is:
J
Jt = Eg,  . (2)
1=l
I first consider the social-planner solution to the problem of choosing the amount
of government expenditures in each district and then consider the outcome when
the same decision is taken in a  legislature.  Assuming that the  social planner
maximizes an unweighted sum of utilities, the solution is characterized by the first
order conditions,
a1v'(aJgJ +  3g-.d)+E/Av(aagk  +±Ag-k)  =  1...,J  (3)
k*J
The interpretation is  straightforward.  The  social planner equates  the  sum of
marginal benefits that representative agents of all districts get from an increase in
9J to the marginal cost (in terms of units of private consumption forgone).  I look
at the symmetric case, a=  a  V j,  to get a tractable solution to this problem.
Note this is not the case people care only  about their own district but that all
districts weigh others in a similar way.  In this case the above first order condition
reduces to:
v'(g*)  =-1  (4)
12 Letting taxes being  proportional rather  than  lump-sum does  not change  any  of  the  central
findings of this  section.  Neither are results  sensitive to the assumption of  equal taxes across
districts.  For unequally distributed taxes across districts, as long as the tax  share of a district is
non-increasing in the number of districts the results with respect to the effect of districting are the
same.
10where  g *  denotes the symmetric government spending in each district in the
social-planner solution.  Note that optimal government spending g * is invariant
to the number of councilmen J and a,  the extent of spillovers between districts.
To  consider the  legislature outcome, we  first have  to  specify the  social
choice rule in  the legislature.  The decision rule I  model  here is  one  which
corresponds to  what  is known as the norm  of  "universalism"  in the  political
science literature.  This is  an environment where through  a policy  of mutual
support ("you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours") every legislator gets what he
wants-in  this case, his desired level of government spending in his district.  In
stipulating his desired level of government expenditure in his district a legislator
takes the  actions of  other representatives as  given and  this  sets up  a  classic
common-pool problem.  The collective outcome is then simply the aggregation of
all such spending proposals.  There is considerable discussion in  the political
science literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the prevalence and stability
of such a norm of universalism in decentralized legislatures.  On the theoretical
side Weingast (1979) discusses conditions under which such a  coalition of the
whole  can  be  a  stable policy  equilibrium.  Fiorina (1978)  and  Shepsle  and
Weingast (1981) also consider situations where players may prefer universalistic
criteria to  pure  majority rule.  On the  empirical  side Weingast,  Shepsle,  and
Johnsen (1981) cite considerable evidence for the claim that, particularly for the
type of pork-barrel policies considered here, "universalism and reciprocity are the
prevailing  decision  rules  in  the  U.S.  Congress"  (p.  353).3  At  the  local
governnent level, Cox and Tutt (1984) provide evidence on the prevalence of this
norm in the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors where, as they discuss,
universalism is not just an informal or unwritten rule-it  was in fact made official
policy by a formal vote of the Board as a rule for allocating expenditures amongst
the  county districts.  As  discussed  above,  an  interesting  literature  exists  on
" For systematic  evidence  on the prevalence  of the norm of universalism  see Collie  (1988). For
case studies see Maass (1951), Ferejohn (1974), Plott (1968), Manley (1970), and Mayhew
(1974).
11examining which  sorts of political institutions can act to  curtail this  tendency
towards  universalism  and  common  pool  type  problems  in  decentralized
legislatures. I develop the model with this assumption, which does not seem to be
devoid of empirical support, and then consider the predictions when the decision-
making process is more centralized.
In  choosing  the desired amount of  spending for  his  district,  legislator j
maximizes y, - [(g, + g-X,)  / J] + v(a.,g, + ,61g 1j)  with respect to  g,  where he
takes the spending proposals of other representatives as given.  The corresponding
first order condition is:
a  1v'(a,g,  +±,6,g  .)  =  (5)
For given  g.j  the  higher is J,  higher is  the  spending  proposed  by  the j-th
representative.  Note  however that if  a,  = 'jI,  the case of perfect homogeneity,
v'(-)=  1 which  is the  socially  optimum.  For  a,  = 1 we  get the  maximum
spending bias.
To move further with the above condition I again consider the symmetric
case of equal a's  across districts.  In this case the above expression reduces to
equal per capita spending given (implicitly) by:
I
v'(g)=  1,  (6)
aJ
where g denotes the legislature outcome.  The concavity of  v(*) together with (4)
and (6) readily gives the main result:
PROPOSITION 1.  For  J > 1 and a  E  (J- ,1], per capita government spending is
(a) greater than socially optimal; and (b) increasing in  J  and in a.
Using the political and fiscal data on cities we can directly test for the effect
of  increasing councilmen  on  city  government  expenditures.  For  the  second
12prediction, I proxy for jurisdictional heterogeneity by using an index of the ethnic
heterogeneity of the city.  Greater ethnic heterogeneity by being associated with
fewer inter-district spillovers would raise government expenditures.  Finally note
that the poor outcome in the legislature arises because of the decentralization of
decision-making.  With  completely  centralized  decision-making,  as  in  one
legislator representing the entire jurisdiction (J  = 1), we would  get the  social
planner outcome shown in (4).  This is one expression of the idea discussed in the
literature that a strong finance minister or head of executive can internalize the
externalities and yield  a  better  outcome than  a decentralized  legislature.  We
should therefore expect that institutional forms of government where jurisdictions
concentrate power in the executive should act to curtail the overspending bias and
in particular we should expect that greater districting is not associated with greater
per capita government expenditures.  In the empirical part of the paper I use the
variation in the institutional form of city governments in the U.S. to test for these
predictions.  Ways in which executives of city governments can be given greater
influence in fiscal decisions include (i)  having the position of an  independent
executive (a  city mayor directly elected  from the population),  (ii) giving the
mayor agenda-setting powers, as  in  the prerogative to  draft  and  propose  the
budget to the city council, and (iii) giving the mayor veto power to enable him to
credibly enforce discipline in the legislature. In the empirical work I use indicator
variables for whether cities have these institutions and see how the presence of
such institutions affects the magnitude of government expenditures.
4.  Data
The data for this paper are a cross-section of U.S. city governments and have been
combined from  different  sources.  Fiscal data  are  from  the  1992 Census of
Governments conducted by the Census Department.  Demographic and income
13data are from the 1990 Census of Population.' 4 Data on the institutional form of
local government have been put together from two sources.  First is a survey of
city governments conducted by an association of local governments in the U.S.,
the International City/County Management Association (ICMA), and pertain to
the  year  1990.  This  survey  collected  considerable infornation  on  political
variables  and  structure  of  local  government  in  a  cross-section  of  U.S.
municipalities. The second source for the data on political institutions is the 1992
Census of Governments, Government Organization File.' 5 The latter source has
less  coverage  in  terms of  the  number of  variables  for  which  information  is
collected but has greater coverage in terms of the number of cities covered.  In the
following paragraphs I describe the variables used in the empirical work.
I measure the size of the legislature by the number of officials elected to the
chief governing body of the government.  For municipalities and townships this
refers to the number of councilmen in the city council (Csize).  This measure
varies from a minimum value of 3 to a maximum of 50 in the dataset.  The cities
with the three largest city councils are New York, NY (36), Stamford, CT (40),
and Chicago, IL (50).  However, most of the observations occur at smaller values
of council-size: 2123 of the 2342 cities for which this measure is available have
city councils composed of 9 or less members.' 6
I use three indicator variables to provide information on the institutional
form of government. Mayorcouncil is a dummy variable which equals one if the
form of government is a mayor-council form, and zero otherwise.  As discussed
above mayor-council forms of government typically have an independent position
of mayor who is elected directly from the city population.  The other major form
"' The  fiscal  and  demographic  data  were  obtained  from  the  County  and  City  Compendium  1993-
a data product  similar  to the Census  Department's  County  and City  Databook  1994  but providing
a more comprehensive  coverage  of U.S. cities-put  out by Slater-Hall Information  Products,
Washington,  DC
IS These data are used in the Census Department's  publication  1992 Census of Governments,
Government  Organization.
16 The results presented below are robust to looking separately  at cities with big and small
councils,  and  in particular,  to looking  at cities  with  councils  of more  than 9 members.
14of city goverrnent  is the council-manager form where the position of the mayor
may exist but is largely ceremonial.  Legislative and executive authority is fused
in the city council.  The difference between these two forms of  governments
corresponds to the difference between presidential and parliamentary systems of
national  government.  I also  use  two  other  indicator variables  to  try  to  get
measures of how much power is given to the Mayor's  office: Budgetm which
equals I if the overall responsibility for developing the budget submitted to the
council rests with the Mayor and Mayveto which equals 1 if the Mayor has the
authority to veto council-passed measures.
The  size of  government is  measured in  three  alternative ways:  (i)  city
government spending per capita which corresponds to the model above (Exppc);
(ii) city government spending as share of total  city  income (Expsh); and city
government employment per capita (Govempi).  All three of these measures have
been used  in the empirical literature on the  size of  government.  I  use three
measures of government size partly to be comprehensive and partly because these
different  measures  are  likely  to  measure  different  aspects  of  the  size  of
government. Consistent findings with these three measures would reassure us that
the results on the size of government were not sensitive to a particular measure of
government size used.  These three measures are quite highly correlated as shown
in the correlation matrix below:
Table  1:
Correlation  between  measures  of  government  size
Exppc  Expsh
Expsh  0.886
Govempl  0.774  0.781
Notes:  No. ot observations  =  1987
The measure of heterogeneity of the jurisdiction, corresponding to a above,
is  an  index  of  ethnic  heterogeneity  (Ethnic)  of  the  city  population  which  I
construct from population-by-race.  This index measures the probability that two
15randomly drawn people from a city will belong to different ethnic groups and is
constructed as follows:
Ethnic = I - s,
where sx denotes the share of population of race i in the total city population, and
i E {  White. Black; American Indian, Asian and Pacific Islander, Other}.
The index ranges from 0 (complete homogeneity) to 1 (complete heterogeneity).
The racial categories are the ones provided by the Census Department and come
from the  1990 Census." 7 I  also construct a  corresponding measure  of  ethnic
heterogeneity for the city council (Cethnic) using councilmen-by-race data.  If it is
indeed true that race plays an important role in city politics  and city residents
choose council men at least partially along ethnic lines, as would be needed for
Ethnic to be a  good proxy for a,  then we should expect to  see an association
between city Ethnic and council Ethnic.  As shown in Figure  I below there is
strong positive  correlation (0.66) between  city  Ethnic  and  the  corresponding
measure for the city council providing some support for using Ethnic as a proxy
for a in the model.
Finally  I  use  a  number  of control  variables  in  the  regressions.  In  all
regressions I control for city size by using the log of city population (Lpop9O). In
addition I also control for per capita income (Incomepc), educational attainment as
measured by the percentage of population with a BA or higher degree (BAGrad),
and income inequality in the city as measured by the ratio of the mean to median
household income (MMI90). The inequality variable is included since the size of
government  may  respond  to  redistributive  pressure  arising  out  of  income
"  Note that "Hispanic"  is not treated  as a category  in the population-by-race  question  but in the
population-by-origin  question  in the Census  questionnaire.  However,  there is a high correlation
(0.91) between  Hispanic  (fraction  of population  of Hispanic origin) and "other" in the above
classification.  This  suggests  that  many  Hispanics  apparently  respond  "other"  because  they  do not
feel adequately  represented  in the multiple  racial choice  provided  by the Census. For practical
purposes,  then,  the  category  "other"  is essentially  "Hispanic."
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Since council-size is the key variable of interest in the empirical section it is
useful  to  consider what  drives  the  variation  of  council-size  in  the  sample.
Theoretically the most obvious determinant of the number of representatives is
city  population.  Bigger jurisdictions  should,  and  do,  have  bigger  councils.
Regressing council-size on  city population  (in  millions)  yields the  following
equation (standard errors in parenthesis):
Csize  =  6.62  +  5.36Pop90,  R2 =0.15,N=1972
(0.07)  (0.29)
The coefficient on  the  council  size variable however  indicates that  although
bigger cities have bigger councils the effect is considerably small in magnitude.
Considering that most of the cities in the sample have populations of less than
100,000, an  increase in the  city population from  10,000 to  100,000 would be
associated with an increase in the council size from 6.7 to 7.2-a  fairly small
18 For a subset  of the cross-section  I had data on the Gini coefficient  as the measure  of income
inequality  in cities,  and  on unemployment  rate city. The findings  on inequality  are robust  to either
measure  of inequality  used.  The unemployment  variable was used to control for government
spending  responding  to unemployment  rate for standard  Keynesian  reasons. The results  reported
on the relationship  between  council size and government  size were robust to the inclusion  of
unemployment  rate  as one of the explanatory  variables.
17effect.' 9 One reason for the slow response of council size to population is that
there are significant costs involved in changing a political institution like the size
of the legislature.  Typically, the process for changing the  size of the council
involves a proposal brought forward either directly by the voters if the city has a
provision for initiative or by the council, extensive discussion of the merits and
demerits of change in the size of the council and the likely impact of a change on
representation (with a  commission being appointed sometimes to  consider the
issue  at  length),  and  approval  by  the  council  or  the  city  population  (by  a
referendum) or both.  There is  an additional reason why council  size may be
particularly  difficult to  change:  a  change  in  the  number  of  seats  inevitably
involves some amount of redistricting which, by reapportioning the constituencies
of the  incumbent council-men, is  likely  to  introduce  uncertainty  in  their  re-
election prospects.  In their influential study of the world's  electoral systems,
Taagepera and  Shugart  (1989) convey this  point well when  they  discuss the
resilience in  electoral  laws: "Reforms usually require the  approval  of current
assembly members. But these are by definition the very people whom the current
electoral system has served well.  Why should they want to change a system that
got them elected?" (p. 5).  To a large extent therefore council-size is determined
by  historical  reasons.  The  inertia  in  council-size  should  give  us  greater
confidence  in  attaching  inference  to  results  from  ordinary  least  squares
regressions of goverm-nent  size on council size, although as part of the sensitivity
analysis of the base results I also run instrumental-variables specifications.
The other important sample correlates of council-size are the state in which
the city is located and the city's  ethnic and income heterogeneity.  Since city
councils derive their authority from state governments and  states vary  in their
laws governing local governments, there is likely to be systematic variation in
'9 The same equation estimated in log-log  form yields an elasticity of council-size with respect to
city  population of  0.11.  For the  same  relationship  at  the  national  level  see  chapter  15 of
Taagepera and Shugart (1989).  They look at a cross-section of countries for the year  1985 and
report an elasticity of national legislature size (lower house) with respect to country population of
around 0.33.
18council-size by state.  Running the same regression as reported above with  a
complete list of  state indicator variables yields an adjusted R-squared of 0.41
while the estimated coefficient on population remains virtually unchanged (and
highly significant), confirmning  the presence of state-specific institutional features
in the determination of council-size.  To the extent that preferences for public
services are correlated along ethnic and income lines we should expect greater
demand for  political  representation in  more  heterogeneous jurisdictions  for  a
given population.  Regressing council-size on population and two measures of
heterogeneity (ethnic, as defined above, and income, measured by the ratio of the
mean to median income) as well as a complete list of state indicator variables
gives:
Csize  = 5.87  +  5.22 Pop9O  +  1.64 Ethnic +  1.02 MMI,  R2 =0.42
(0.25)  (0.39)  (0.40)
The regressions for government size reported below include these measures of
income and ethnic heterogeneity on the right hand  side of the equation.  The
coefficients  on  these  variables  therefore  measure  their  direct  impact  on
government size, controlling for the effect that may go through council-size.
5.  Results
The discussion of empirical results is organized in three sections.  First I present
the base  results concerning council  size, ethnic  heterogeneity and  government
size.  I present results from a sensitivity analysis of the base specification and
argue that the basic relationship is fairly robust.  Next I present results concerning
at-large, district, and mixed electoral systems.  Finally I present results concerning
the institutional form of government and  degree to which  it can act to curtail
overspending.
195.1  Base Results
Table 3 shows  the base results from OLS regressions. Expenditures  per capita,
government  employment  per  capita,  population  and  council size are all used in log
form because  of the presence  of large outliers in these series. 20 For each of the
three measures  of government  size the first regression  includes only population
and council  size. The second  regression  adds Ethnic. The third regression  adds
the control variables.  The controls include per  capita income, educational
attainment,  and a measure of income  inequality. I control for per capita income
since  richer cities  may have greater  demand  for public  services. In the traditional
explanation  for the existence  of government-namely that governments  exist to
provide  public goods and alleviate  problems  of externalities-the coefficient  on
income  measures  the income  elasticity  of demand  for public  goods. Most studies
find  this demand  to be income  inelastic. 2'  This would  imply a positive  coefficient
in the regression for expenditures  per capita but a negative coefficient  when
government  size is measured as the share of government  expenditure  in total
income.  I include educational attainment  of the city population since more
educated city residents may be  able to  better monitor the  conduct of  the
councilmen  and limit the size of government. I control for income inequality
since  a broad  class of models  in the macro/political  economy  literature  relate  size
of government  to redistributive  pressure  arising  out of income inequality. 22 Since
error variances  may be affected  by city size, heteroskedasticity  is likely  to be an
issue and I use White's heteroskedasticity  consistent  variance-covariance  matrix
for estimating  the standard  errors. The number  of observations  is close to 2,000
for all the regressions.
The results  presented  in table 3 indicate  statistically  significant  evidence  for
the presence  of overspending  bias in legislatures.  The coefficients  on council-size
20 The  qualitative  results,  and  statistical  significance  of estimated  coefficients,  is robust  to using
these  variables  in levels  rather  than logs.
See for instance  the review  provided  by Mueller  (1985).
22 The classic  reference  on this is Meltzer  and Richard  (1981).
20are positive and strongly significant, with and without control variables.  The
findings  are  consistent  across  the  alternative measures  used  of  the  size  of
government.  The magnitude of the effect is also considerable.  The coefficients
on the council-size variable indicate that, controlling for population of the city and
other socio-economic variables,  a  10% increase  in  the  size  of  legislature is
associated with a  3% increase in government spending per capita, a 2% point
increase in  share of  government in total  income,  and a  5%  increase in  local
government employment per  capita.  Evaluated at  the  sample  means,  these
coefficients imply that, keeping city population and other characteristics constant,
an additional councilman adds on average $0.8 million to the city budget.  Median
city budget for the sample is $17.5 million. 23
The coefficient on  Ethnic  is  in  the  expected direction.  Greater  ethnic
heterogeneity is associated with a bigger government, consistent with the theory
above that in a more heterogeneous society a is likely to be greater and hence the
over-spending bias  likely  to  be  greater.  This  variable  is  significant  in  all
specifications with  council-size except  for  the  specification  with  government
employment with the controls (last equation in table 3).  A one standard deviation
increase in ethnic heterogeneity is associated with approximately a 3% increase in
govemment expenditures per capita ($22 per capita at sample mean).  For further
investigating the effect of this variable, particularly if the effect is coming from
lack of  internalization of externalities  by  councilmen when  they  are  a  more
heterogeneous group, I repeated the regressions using the corresponding measure
of ethnic heterogeneity for the council, Cethnic.  The results were very similar
although the estimated coefficients on CEthnic were slightly smaller.  Note also
that the magnitude of the coefficient on Ethnic  becomes considerably  smaller
when the controls are added.  Further investigation revealed that the effect comes
primarily from the inclusion of the inequality variable.  More heterogeneous cities
23 I checked  the regression  results  for the presence  of influential  outliers. Three  (Dana Point,  CA;
Laguna  Niguel,  CA; and Yucaipa, CA) cities come out with particularly  negative  residuals in
21have greater income inequality (correlation coefficient = 0.26) and both act to
increase government size.
The results on the inequality variable are particularly interesting.  There is
an  extensive  macro/political  economy  literature  on  income  inequality,
redistribution, and  economic growth.  The stylized  relationship  is. that  more
inequality leads to greater redistributive activity by the government which hurts
economic growth.  However the empirical evidence for the relationship between
inequality and redistributive activity -is weak. 24 The results in table  3 indicate
strong  evidence for  the  positive  relationship between  income  inequality  and
government size.  To the extent that at least some governmental expenditures are
redistributive in nature, particularly local government employment which is often
used  for  patronage  purposes,  these  findings  provide  some  support  for  the
hypothesized  positive  relationship  between  inequality  and  redistributive
govermment  activity.  A one standard deviation increase in the ratio of mean-to-
median  household  income  is  correlated with  a  10%  increase  in  government
expenditures per capita-an  effect of considerable magnitude.  The results were
similar from a subset of the sample for which I had data on the Gini coefficient of
income inequality.  These results corroborate the finding in Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly (1998).
The results on the other variables are in the expected direction.  Government
expenditures per capita go up with per capita income, but government as a share
in total income declines with income, consistent with the empirical literature on
the income elasticity of demand for local public goods.  Educational attainment is
negatively associated with government size-more  educated cities have smaller
governments.
regressions  for government  size. All regressions  were estimated  excluding  these  three cities. No
major  changes  in the results  were observed.
24 See  for instance  the review  by Benabou  (1996).
225.2  Sensitivity Analysis
In  is  section I address several possible areas of concern in interpreting the above
results, namely, omitted variables (particularly state-specific fixed effects), non-
linear interactions, and potential endogeneity in the basic specification.  My main
variable of interest is the council size variable.  Results of the sensitivity analysis
for the ethnic heterogeneity variable are largely consistent with the base results.
The first area I address is the presence of state-specific fixed effects.  It is
possible that because of state-specific institutional features both government size
and council size may vary systematically by state.  For example, some states may
have a more decentralized institutional set up for the provision of local public
services.  This may lead to both greater city government expenditure and bigger
city councils, leading to a spurious correlation between the two.  This seems to be
an important concern and therefore I try to address it in three ways.  First, I add a
complete list of  state dummies to  the regression  equations  presented above. 25
Second, I use a proxy variable to try to measure the degree to which there might
be state influence on the city government.  The variable I use is the share, in total
city revenue, of intergovermmental  revenue from the state.  I present regression
results including this variable both with and without state dummies.  Finally, I run
regressions  for just  one  state,  California, which  has  the  largest  number  of
observations in the sample.
Results are shown in rows 2 - 5 in table 4.  The table reports coefficients on
Csize for a number of alternative specifications. 26 The first row corresponds to the
baseline coefficients from the equation with the full sets of controls in table 3.
Each successive row shows the effect of including additional control variables or
splitting the sample along different dimensions. There is some evidence for state-
specific effects in affecting the relationship between Csize and government size.
Comparing the first row of table 4 to the third equation of table 3, we see that the
25 Note  there  are  no observations  in the  data  set  for  the  District  of Columbia  and  Hawaii.
26 Complete  results  are available  upon  request.
23coefficient on council  size drops to  about a  third of  its value. 27 The second
equation in table 4 shows that directly controlling for state influence, using the
state-share variable, does not  affect much the estimated coefficient on council
size.  The state-specific effects therefore seem to be  going through some other
channel.  Note that, in contrast to equations the first and third rows of table 4,
when regressions are run just  for California-therefore  fully taking into account
any state specific effects-the  coefficient on council size is as strong as in the
regressions of  table  3.  This  pattern  of results  is  consistent  across the  three
measures of government size. Note that council size is statistically significant at
conventional levels in all specifications. 28
Another possible area of concern in interpreting the results on the council
size variable is the claim that it is not council size per se but the number of ethnic
groups in the city council which, possibly through a similar common-pool type
argument, is  driving up government expenditures.  Since bigger councils  are
likely to be more heterogeneous, council-size may be proxying for the number of
(effective)  ethnic  groups  in  the  council.  Note  this  would  have  different
implications since it would imply that for ethnically homogeneous councils we
should not see an overspending bias depending on the number of council men. It
turns out that while the number of ethnic groups in the city council may also be
driving up government expenditures, the council-size effect persists.  First note
that the correlation between the effective number of ethnic groups and council-
27 Some  of this effect  is coming  from not controlling  for the institutional  form of city  government.
When  we control  for this in section  5.4, the estimated  coefficient  on the council-size  variable is
about  two-thirds  of its magnitude  in  the base  results. See  table 8.
2B An interesting  finding  also emerges  on the state revenue share variable.  It is negative and
significant  when we control  for state dummies. Theoretically  there is a reason  to expect  either a
positive  or a negative  relationship  between  this variable and govermment  size.  On the one hand,
when a greater fraction of expenditures  are financed  by transfers from the state, the costs of
additional  spending  proposals  are spread  over  the entire state while the benefits  are concentrated
only in the city.  The overspending  bias should therefore  be greater and the entire city council
should  be united  in  wanting  higher  expenditures.  On the other  hand, however,  a higher  state share
in total revenue  may indicate  that the state has greater say in the fiscal decisions  of the local
government.  If this is the case  then the state can act to correct  the overspending  bias in the local
legislature,  yielding a negative relationship  between  state revenue share and local government
expenditures.  The  evidence  seems  more  consistent  with  the latter  interpretation.
24size in the sample is very weak: the correlation coefficient is 0.04 and  is not
statistically significant. 29 Second, we are already controlling to some extent for
the number of ethnic groups in the city council since more heterogeneous cities
elect more heterogeneous councils and we control for ethnic heterogeneity of the
city.  Third, I explicitly control for the effective number of ethnic groups in the
city council in addition to the standard set of variables (including Ethnic).  Results
are  in  row  6  of  table  4  where  the  coefficients  on  Csize  are  reported  after
controlling for the effective number of ethnic groups in the council.  Compared to
the base-line  coefficients there  is  a  slight reduction in  the  magnitude  of the
coefficient indicating that a  small part of the effect may be  going through this
channel.  The council-size effect persists however.  In addition the coefficient on
the effective number of ethnic groups is positive although not significant at 5% in
2 out of the three specifications.
The remaining rows in table 4 show the results from other checks on the
basic result.  I investigate non-linear interactions with city size and with ethnic
heterogeneity.  This is done partly to capture the commonly discussed idea that
big cities (which are also more heterogeneous) have their special problems and
may attain poorer outcomes for reasons other than the externalities inherent in
distributive politics.  Although we control for both of these because of non-linear
interactions we may not be capturing the true relationship and the results may be
being driven by the differences between two distinct groups of cities.  Splitting
the sample at the median with respect to each of the variables and running the
base-line  regressions (next four  rows  of  table  4)  indicates  that  the  effect  of
districting on government size is present within each group as well.  The results
also indicate that the magnitude of the relationship is stronger in bigger and more
29 The  effective number  of ethnic  groups  is simply  the reciprocal  of I minus  the ETHNIC  variable
for the city  council  using  councilmen-by  -race  data. When  ethnic  groups  are distributed  equally,  it
equals  the number  of ethnic groups. When groups are not distributed  symmetrically,  as in one
large group and several small groups, it is less than the number of  groups to  capture the
"effective"  number  of groups. This is the same variable used by, for instance,  Taagepera  and
Shugart  (1989),  Ordeshook  and Shvetsova  (1994),  and  Cox (1997)  in their studies  of the effects  of
electoral  systems  on the number  of effective  parties  in the legislature.
25heterogeneous cities. Note that the standard errors associated with the coefficient
on Csize are somewhat bigger in regression for cities smaller than the median
population (and in one specification Csize is not significant at 5%).  This is likely
due to the smaller variation in the Csize variable when we look at just  smaller
cities.  The Csize variable ranges from 3 to 19 in one sample and from 4 to 50 in
the other.
Related to the spirit of the above analysis I look at two more potentially
omitted variables: inner-city versus suburban versus rural cities  and population
density.  There may be systematic difference between inner cities  and suburbs
which are correlated with both desired government expenditures and council size.
Central city residents typically favour greater public services and because of being
more heterogeneous may also desire bigger city councils.  Suburbs generally have
the opposite characteristics. The same effect to some extent can be picked up in
the population density variable.  Controlling for each of these types of possible
omissions indicates shows that the council-size-government size relationship is
robust even though it declines in magnitude somewhat when we take the central
city / suburban city difference into account.
Another possible source of bias  in  the results  could be  from  systematic
variation in political preferences across cities.  Residents of some cities, because
of their political inclinations on the left-right spectrum, may prefer government to
play a bigger role in their lives and this may lead to  both greater government
expenditures and  bigger city councils. To the extent that political preferences are
determined in part by income, ethnicity, and other economic characteristics, it
should be noted that we are already controlling, at least to some extent, for such
factors. Nevertheless it would be useful to try to directly control for the variation
in political preferences across cities.  One way we could try to measure this is by
using voting data in the 1992 presidential election on the percentages voting for a
Democrat  President.  Although many  factors  are  likely  to  go  into  a  voting
decision,  given  the  conventional  political  platforms  of  the  Democrat  and
26Republican parties we should expect that city residents with  a innate political
preference for big government are, all else being equal, more likely to vote for a
Democrat candidate. Unfortunately data at the city level for the 1992 presidential
election are not  available but  such data  are available at  the county  level. 30 I
mapped each city in the sample to the county it is located in and used the county
electoral data  as  a  proxy for  the  city  electoral  variable. 3"  The results  after
controlling for this variable are shown in the last row in table 4.  The estimated
magnitude on the council-size variable reduces somewhat in magnitude but  is
statistically significant.  The coefficient on the voting variable is positive in 2 out
of the 3 specifications but is not statistically significant.
A final area  of concern is the  potential endogeneity of  the  council-size
variable.  It  could be  argued that  bigger  city  government  needs  bigger  city
councils.  Thus, if residents of a particular city want, a priori, bigger government
we will get bigger councils and the direction of causality might be the opposite to
that  hypothesized  above.  It  is  not  obvious,  however,  why  wanting  bigger
government should lead to wanting bigger city councils.  The city council refers
to the legislative function of government, as opposed to the executive functioni. If
people, for whatever reason, desire greater redistribution they can get the same
sized council to raise the scale of transfer programs for instance.  If redistribution
is to be effected through public works projects, a greater number of projects may
require more staff for planning and executing these projects.  However these staff
would typically not mean more council men but more employees in the relevant
city departments.  Empirically the strongest argument for the exogeneity of the
council-size  variable is  that  council-size is  relatively  difficult  to  change-as
discussed above in the context of how population  affects council  size-while
government expenditures change frequently.
30 I was also  unable  to find  data for the entire  cross-section  of cities for House  or Senate  elections.
3  For this to be a good proxy it requires  that there  be relatively  high correlation  across  cities in a
county on voting patterns.  In the absence of direct information  on how large or small this
variation  may be, the results  on this variable  should  be interpreted  with  caution.
27I present results with instrumental variables to empirically address this issue
of endogeneity.  I instrument for Csize using its decade earlier value. 32 Results
from two-stage least squares regressions are presented in table 5, with and without
state dummies.  For convenience the table also reports OLS regressions for the
corresponding samples.  For each measure of government size, the first pair of
equations (one OLS the other TSLS) excludes state dummies and the second pair
includes them.  Note that the decade earlier value of  Csize is  available for  a
smaller nunber  of observations.  If endogeneity were an issue, OLS coefficient
estimates would be  biased and  inconsistent, while TSLS  estimates would  be
consistent (although they might be biased). The OLS and TSLS results presented
side-by-side in the table show that the point estimates remain virtually unchanged.
Moreover, when the difference is noticeable, as in  the first two  equations for
expenditure shares, the relationship becomes stronger.  The standard errors are
generally larger in the TSLS specification than the ones in the corresponding OLS
regressions but this is to be expected since TSLS is not efficient.  The results in
table 5 therefore indicate that, to the extent that the decade earlier value of Csize
is a good instrument, results are not contaminated by endogeneity.
5.3  Electoral Systems: District, Mixed, and At-large Systems
So  far  I  have  been  using  the  terms  number  of  districts  and  council-size
interchangeably. To be precise I have been using the number of councilmen and
not the number of political districts as the relevant right hand side variable.  The
two may not be the same in cities with mixed or at-large electoral districts where
more than one candidate is retumed from the same district. 33 The results in this
section will justify the use of council-size as the relevant variable.
32 An earlier observation on council-size would be a better instrument but such data do not seem to
be readily available for a large-enough cross-section considered here.  Between 1980 and 1990 the
council size changed in approximately 20% of the cities in the sample.
33 In nearly all cities at-large councilmen are elected from the whole city.  Only in a small fraction
however are there several multi-member districts.  Although I do not have the data to distinguish
between single-member and multi-member district systems, Welch (1990) collected these data in a
28The three predominant fonns  of electoral systems used in  US  cities  are
district  (or  ward) systems, at-large systems,  and  mixed  systems where  some
councilmen are elected by district and some at-large from the city.  Most cities in
the sample have at-large systems: 56% of the total number of cities in the sample
have at-large systems, 17% have district systems, and the remaining 27% have a
mixed system. It is commonly believed that at-large systems, compared to district
systems, can help to curtail pork-barrel type spending by inducing councilmen to
treat the entire city as their constituency. For instance, Richard S. Childs, an early
municipal reformer, noted the following as a criticism of ward systems (and a
recommendation for  at-large systems):  "ward  elections  notoriously  produced
political  small fry  who  intrigued  in the  council  for  petty  favors  and  sought
appropriations for their wards in reckless disregard of city-wide interests and the
total budget" (Childs (1965), p. 37).  In their review of the argument for adopting
at-large  systems  in  U.S.  cities,  Engstrom  and  McDonald  (1986)  note  that
councilmen elected at large were "expected to make decisions on the basis of what
they perceived to be good for the entire city, not just one  geographic or social
segment of it" (p. 203).  If at-large councilmen did cater to the good of the entire
city the asymmetry in sharing the benefits and costs of public expenditures would
be removed and the overspending bias would disappear.  Alternatively, if at-large
councilmen, despite running from the whole city, had "home bases" or particular
constituencies comprising of subsets of the city population that they sought to
distribute expenditures to in exchange for votes we would expect the same effect
from increasing at-large councilmen as from district council men.  In this section I
contrast the predictions of these two hypotheses and test them from the data on
electoral systems. 34 Results indicate that although critics of district systems may
survey  and found  that 1.9%  of her sample  comprised  of such cities. For the empirical  purposes
therefore  I take  the district  electoral  systems  to mean  single-member  district  systems.
3  The existing  discussion  of at-large/district/mixed  systems  in the literature  has been in terms of
the impact  on how  well  they represent  minorities  in city  councils. The stylized  relationship  is that
at-large systems,  compared to  district systems, do poorly at representing minorities in city
councils. Using  my data I can check  for this and do find evidence  consistent  with this view: the
marginal  effect  of city ethnic  heterogeneity  on council  heterogeneity  is systematically  lower  in at-
29have been right in thinking that district systems contribute to overspending, they
were  likely  wrong in  supposing that  at-large councilmen would  not  cater  to
particular constituencies within the jurisdiction.
In a city with J total elected council-men let JD  denote the number elected by
district, and let JL  =  J - JD  denote the number elected at-large.  Desired per capita
govermnent spending of each type is denoted gD  and gL  respectively.  With these
two  types  of  councilmen  wanting  in  general  different  amounts  of  city
expenditures we have to model some kind of rule by which the outcome is chosen.
It is natural to assume that the degree to which each group can influence the
outcome  is  proportional to  its  relative  strength in  the  council.  In  particular
assume  that  the  outcome  (g)  is  a  weighted  average  of  the  two  desired
expenditures:
g = A(gD) + (1-  A)gL  Os2￿s1.  (7)
In  general  A  could  be  modeled  as  A = AQ(J{) with  the  properties  that
A(O)  =  O, 2(l) = 1, and 2'(.)  2 0.  For simplicity assume that  A =  JD  so that the
extent to which district councilmen get their desired outcome directly depends on
their  proportionate share  in  the council.  We  can  now  state two  alternative
hypotheses for how at-large councilmen act in comparison to district council-men.
Hypothesis I: At-large councilmen cater to the common good of the whole city.
Their constituency is the whole city, as such they face no asymmetry between
benefits and costs of policies and face no overspending bias.  In particular their
desired spending is given by the social optimum  given in  equation (4) above.
That is,  gL  =  g* and recall that this is invariant to the number of councilmen.
District councilmen behave as before and their desired spending goes up in the
large  cities  than in mixed  and district  cities.  If at-large  systems  reduce the effective  number of
ethnic  groups  in the city  council  (and  this reduces  total  expenditures)  we could be over-measuring
the effect  of district  and  at-large  systems  on expenditures.  For all results reported below I repeat
them controlling  for the effective  number  of ethnic groups in the city council (both overall  and
30total number  of districts. From  (6), gD  = g =  g(JD)  where  g'(.)  > 0.  City-wide
per capita spending is therefore:
g =  AWLJD)  +  (I - )g
Differentiating with  respect  to  JD  and  JL  we  can  derive  the  predictions  of
Hypothesis I:
District systems  At-large systems  Mixed systems
->  o  a,k  =  >  ar  '  '- 
Thus in mixed systems, for given number of district councilmen, increasing the
number at-large should decrease overall expenditures per  capita since at-large
councilmen gain in  strength and can push the  outcome  toward their  ideal  of
smaller spending.
Now consider the implications of the alternative hypothesis.
Hypothesis II:  At-large councilmen cater to particular  constituencies and face
the same asymmetry between benefits  and costs  of  their policy  proposals  as
district councilmen.
In  this  case  both  councilmen at-large  and  by-district  would  face  the  same
overspending bias so that the desired spending of each would depend on the total
size of the council.  If  district and at-large councilmen face exactly the same
overspending  bias  we  have  g= = g=  g(J)  = g  and  we  readily  have  the
predicted marginal effects 35:
interacted with the electoral system).  None of the results presented below are sensitive to these
additional controls.
3  We  can  also  allow  for  a  weaker  version  of  hypothesis  11:  gL  = gL(J),gD  = gD(J),
g'  (.) > O,i  = L,D,  where possibly  gL(.)  a  gD(.).  That is, the two types of councilmen can face
an overspending bias to different degrees.  In this more general case we get the same predicted
marginal effects with the additional assumption that  g'  ()  > 0, i= L, D,  is not too small.  This
weak assumption is needed because suppose that gL  < gD  and there is an increase in the number of
at-large councilmen.  Both gL  and gD  will rise  but at the  same time the  weight  A  will shift
31District systems  At-large systems  Mixed systems
->0  ->  O  > 0,  ->  0.
The  empirical  test  to  discriminate  between  these  two  hypotheses  can  be
implemented by running the regression:
g= A  +±/3DDJ,) +ADLJL  +AI3 (-DD  -D/)JD  +/ 4(1-D  -D  )J 1 +Z/  +g
where  Di, i=  D,  L,  is  a  indicator variable for  district  and  at-large  electoral
systems respectively and the matrix Z includes the standard set of controls. ),6 and
/32  pick out the marginal effects in pure district and at-large systems while A and
/64  pick out the  effects in  mixed  systems.  The predicted  coefficients are as
follows:
A  A2  A3  4
Hypothesis I:  +  0  +
Hypothesis II:  +  +  +  +
Identification rests on the different predictions for  82  and fl,  that is the effect of
at-large councilmen in at-large and mixed systems.
Results are presented in table 6.36 In addition to the variable shown the
regressions include the standard set of controls.  For each  specification the F-
statistic corresponding to the joint test  2  = 0,  A  =  0 along with the p-value are
also reported.  The test strongly rejects for each specification.  The evidence is
inconsistent  with  the  view  that  at-large  councilmen  suffer  less  from  an
towards  gL.  If gL does not rise fast enough  the weighted  average  could fall. This  weaker  version
of the hypothesis  yields another  prediction  (which  does not this assumption)  and which can be
tested: gD  >  gL  =z  gD  (v>  gL(.)
36  I revert to using levels rather than logs since under the hypothesis that the effects  of at-large  and
district councilmen are exactly the same  6,  = /4  but  log(J  ) + log(J  ) #  log(JD  t  JL) 
32overspending bias.  The similarity of results across the two types of  electoral
systems suggests that in at-large systems politicians can specialize along some
dimension other than geography.  The difference between the two systems is that
in  district  systems  the  voter  pool  for  a  politician  is  pre-defined  based  on
geography. To win, a candidate needs a plurality of votes cast in that city ward.
In at large systems, politicians can carve out their own voter pool, or "district,"
and this frees them up to specialize along some other dimension, such as ethnicity,
age group, or other dimensions.  In effect therefore both types of politicians have
districts they seek to bring distributive spending to and this can account for the
similarity of results across the two types. 37
Further inspection of the coefficients in table 6 indicates two other patterns.
First,  comparing  /3, to  A  and  A  to  A  we  see  that  if  anything  at-large
councilmen suffer slightly more from an overspending bias (the formal joint test
A  =  A2 and  Al = A  does not reject (at 5%) for 2 out of the 3 specifications).
Second, mixed systems seem to  be worse than both pure district  and  at-large
systems. The effect of an additional councilmen (whether elected by district or at-
large) is greater  if he  is in  a  mixed electoral system  instead of  a  non-mixed
system.  I explore this  further by  looking separately at mixed  and  non-mixed
samples. The difference with the earlier specification is that I am unconstraining
all the coefficients and not just  the ones on the at-large and district councilmen
with respect to the two samples.  I also use a log specification which allows us to
compare the magnitudes of the effects to the results presented earlier while at the
37 There  does  not exist  much  theoretical  work in either  economics  or political  science  on the effect
of differential impact of at-large and district systems on pork-barrel spending.  One theoretical
piece which is consistent with the findings presented here is Myerson (1993).  He considers the
issue of when a candidate would try to appeal more broadly to all voters versus when she will
concentrate more  narrowly  on  winning the  support  of  minorities or  special  interest  groups.
Interestingly he finds that for both single-member and multi-member districts the incentives to
cultivate the vote of a minority are the same if the electoral system is based on plurality voting, as
city systems are.  The findings are different for single-member vs. multi-member districts when
the system is based on proportional representation.  As noted earlier all cities in the U.S. except
Cambridge, MA use a form of plurality voting.
33same time allowing us the compare the relative effects of the district and at-large
councilmen:
g = ao + a,  J  log(J)  + a2  JL log(J)  +  Za3  +  e
This way of transforming the at-large and district councilmen variables has the
advantage that under the null hypothesis of a, = a2  we simply get log(J) and that
a, >a2  4*  It  > 0  .
Results are presented in table 7.  The pattern of results is similar to the one
in table 6 with the difference between mixed and non-mixed systems somewhat
more striking. For all three measures of government size the marginal effects are
stronger in mixed systems than non-mixed systems.  One hypothesis consistent
with these  findings  is that  in  addition  to  the  externalities which  councilmen
impose on each other within a group there are also inter-group externalities which
they fail to internalize, hence leading to worse outcomes than either pure district
or at-large systems.  The results also shed some light on the choice of electoral
systems.  Historically cities had district electoral systems.  During the early parts
of the  century the at-large system  was introduced to  break up  the power  of
machines on city governments.  However one feature of at-large systems is that
they do poorer at representing minorities in  city councils.  Hence some cities
argued for adopting mixed systems where they could get the representation of
district  systems and  at the same the whole-city  oriented  influence of  at-large
councilmen.  The evidence in the results discussed above indicates that mixed
system may in fact end up faring worse.
5.4  Institutional Form of Government
Finally  I  turn  to  testing  the  effect  of  institutional  form  of  government  on
government size.  Theory predicts that institutions  which credibly  concentrate
34power in one figure in the government can help to sever the link between council
size and government size. To test for this I run the following regression:
log(g) = a + ,  log(J) + y D -log(J) + ZS + 6
where D is an indicator variable (or a set of indicator variables) for a centralized
budget institution and the matrix Z includes the remaining variables used in the
above regressions.  As discussed above a city government is likely to have a more
centralized budget institution when it has the mayor-council form of govermnent,
the mayor has agenda setting powers, and the mayor has veto-power to credibly
enforce discipline in  the legislature. In such  forms of  government we  should
expect to see the link between legislature size and government size weakened.
d log(g) That is we should expect  =lg(XJ)  =, + y  r  0.
The results of estimating the above equation are presented in table 8. The
first regression, for each measure of government size, is run with an indicator for
the form  of government.  The second includes indicators  for mayor's  agenda
setting and  veto powers-measures  of actual mayor power  and the  degree to
which he can enforce discipline on the council.  In the third regression both the
form of government and mayor strength indicators are included.
The general results are in the expected direction although the evidence on
the institutional variables is not as clear-cut as that on the council size variable.
The findings are stronger on two measures of government size: expenditures per
capita and government employment per capita.  Actual measures of mayor power
seem to be more important than the form of government.  In particular, mayor
veto power seems to be an important determinant of government size.  There is a
fair degree of multicolinearity between the three institutional variables.  Since in
independent  regressions  mayor  strength  variables  seem  more  important,  I
concentrate on the second and third regressions for each measure of government
size.  A  comparison  of  the  coefficients  on  log(Council  Size)  and
Mayveto x log(Council Size)  provides  some  evidence  for  the  hypothesized
35relationship above and can be stated as follows: the relationship between council
size and government size is severed when we switch to a strong-mayor form of
government.  The closeness of the coefficients is again striking for government
employment per capita. It should also be noted that the coefficients on the council
size variable are bigger in magnitude than those reported in table 4 though still not
as large as those in the base results of table 3.  This is reassuring since it indicates
that part of the reduction in the magnitude of the council size effect when we
controlled for state dummies was coming from the variation in the institutional
form of government.
A  somewhat  puzzling  finding  emerges  on  the  strong-mayor  dummy
variable.  The mayor-veto dummy is positive and significant in two out of the
three specifications.  This means that when we switch to a strong mayor form of
government two effects happen: one, there is a positive intercept increase in the
size of government and, two, there is a decrease in the size of government from
the council size effect.  Evaluated at the sample means these effects cancel each
other out.  However, city governments with small councils, are likely to have a
bigger government with a strong-mayor form than otherwise.  This is somewhat
puzzling because a piori we would have expected the intercept effect to be non-
positive.  One possible explanation is that there may be  strong-mayor related
patronage spending which we do not account for.  If strong mayor forms mean
that the mayor, in addition to enforcing discipline in the council, finds it easier to
pursue patronage related spending for his own political ambitions then we would
get  a  positive  independent  effect  of  a  strong-mayor  form  on  the  size  of
government. 3 8  Another interesting possibility is to consider that the institutional
form of government is also a choice at some level.  If cities which are more prone
to having fiscal problems choose  strong-mayor forms of  government then the
coefficient on the institutional dummy is likely to be biased upwards.  Probit and
logit regressions for the mayor-strength variable indicate a very strong effect of
36council size: cities with bigger councils-thus  those where the overspending bias
is greater-are  much more likely to choose a strong-mayor form of govermnent.
This opens up an interesting avenue of research for estimating a  simultaneous
system for the size and institutional form of government.3
6.  Conclusion
The purpose  of  this  paper  has  been  to  present  theory  and  evidence  on  the
overspending bias  that  can  arise in  a  political jurisdiction  in  the  context  of
districting, generalized taxation,  and  a norm  of universalism.  The  empirical
results can be summarized as follows:
*  Government spending goes up with districting and  ethnic heterogeneity
and the  relationship is  robust to  controlling for  a  number  of possible
omitted variables.
D  At-large  electoral  systems  do  not  reduce  the  over-spending  bias  in
legislatures.  The sensitivity of expenditures to council size is greater in
mixed systems than either pure district or pure at-large systems.
*  There  is  some  evidence that  strong  mayor forms  of  city  government,
particularly  those  where  mayors  have  veto  powers  can  curtail  the
overspending bias.
I  close by describing ways in  which  I  am working  on extending  the  line  of
research started in this paper.
One issue that has not been addressed in the present framework has been the
issue of equity in the distribution of government expenditures across districts.
The model makes predictions about the size of govermment  expenditures but does
not make predictions about how their distribution across districts may change with
3S For this argument  to explain  the results  it would  have  to be the case  that strong  mayors  get away
with  patronage  related  spending  more  easily  when  they are faced  with  smaller  city councils.
3  In a related  paper I am pursuing  this further.
37greater districting.  Part of the reason why I restrict attention in this paper to the
size dimension is that the data I have is at the most micro level of government and
I do not  have expenditure data by city district.  One likely benefit of  greater
districting would seem to be to produce a more equitable, or more democratic,
distribution of government expenditures across districts.  This tradeoff between
the costs  and  benefits  of  greater  districting  could  be  usefully  added  to  the
theoretical framework considered here.
On the empirical side there are two directions to extend the work.  First, I
intend to examine how districting may affect measures of fiscal balance-budget
deficits and city government debt.  The findings presented so far relate to the size
of the  budget and  not  to  indicators  of  budgetary  balance.  Second,  as  was
suggested above a  simultaneous system  should be  estimated for the  size and
institutional form of government. A key issue in this area would be identification
of a  suitable instrument for the form of government.  The findings should be
particularly interesting since not much empirical literature exists on explaining the
choice of the institutional form of governnent.
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42Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable  Units  Min  Max  Median  Mean  Std  Dev.  N
Csize  No. of people  3  50  6  6.859  2.888  2342
Exppc  $1,000 per capita  0.020  7.836  0.641  0.791  0.539  1991
Expsh  Percentage  0.078  44.660  4.933  5.973  4.123  1991
Govempl  Employees  per  0.429  98.873  9.746  12.101  8.835  1996
1,000 population
Ethnic  Fraction  0.004  0.730  0.187  0.235  0.173  - 3146
Cethnic  Fraction  0  0.720  0  0.122  0.180  1779
Pop9O  No. of people  10,005  7,322,564  21,099  45,540  173,103  3146
Incomepc  $1,000 per capita  4.382  63.302  13.865  15.277  5.973  3146
BAGrad  Fraction  0.007  0.909  0.188  0.225  0.129  3146
MMI90  Ratio  0.986  4.777  1.213  1.248  0.185  3146
Districtcg  No. of people  0  50  0  2.856  4.048  2342
Largecg  No. of people  0  16  5  4.003  2.731  2342
Mayorcouncil  Dummy variable  0  1  0  0.377  0.485  1785
Budgetm  Dummy variable  0  1  0  0.171  0.377  1751
Mayveto  Dummy variable  0  1  0  0.343  0.475  1745
43Table  3: Base  Results
OLS Regressions  for Government  Size
Log  (Expenditures  per capita)  Expenditure  share  Log  (Govt.  employment  per capita)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)
Constant  -2.482  -2.382  -3.397  -5.518  -3.090  -8.543  0.990  1.218  -0.512
-17.283  -16.488  -18.612  -3,636  -2.055  -4.975  6.414  7.796  -2.581
Log  (Council  Size)  0.276  0.295  0.302  2.012  2.468  2.066  0.508  0.550  0.500
7.185  7.545  7.885  6.701  8.251  7.014  12.109  13.085  12.270
Log(Pop90)  0.151  0.133  0.131  0.748  0.301  0.563  0.035  -0.007  0.023
11.428  9.348  9.387  5.806  2.229  4.330  2.364  -0.473  1.541
Ethnic  0.226  0.192  5.482  2.522  0.517  0.070
3.040  2.432  8.620  4.000  5.965  0.790
Income  per capita  0.023  -0.115  -0.004
6.405  -5.651  -0.996
% BA Grad  -0.606  -4.259  -0.544
-3.943  -3.933  -3.125
Mean/Median  Income  0.661  5.408  1.424
7.177  8.688  13.192
No. of obs.  1972  1972  1972  1972  1972  1972  1977  1977  1977
Adj. R-sq  0.102  0.106  0.146  0.065  0.109  0.187  0.082  0.100  0.198
S.E. of regression  0.536  0.535  0.523  3.994  3.898  3.723  0.590  0.584  0.551
Notes:  White's  heteroskedasticity  consistent  t-statistics  are  reported  below  coefficient  estimates.
44Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis
Specification  Log  (Exppc)  Expsh  Log  (Govempl)
Coeff  t-stat  Coeff  t-stat  Coeff  t-stat
0) Base-line estimates  0.302  7.89  2.066  7.01  0.500  12.27
1)  State-specific effects:
a)  State dummies  0.103  2.79  0.870  2.78  0.144  3.85
b)  State  share in total revenue  0.254  6.86  1.754  6.17  0.470  11.38
c)  State  dummies  with state share in total revenue  0.108  2.89  0.886  2.77  0.147  3.84
d)  Sample = California  0.307  2.06  2.842  2.38  0.379  2.43
2)  Effective number of ethnic  groups  0.274  5.61  1.778  4.87  0.481  9.32
3)  Big cities vs. small cities
a)  Pop9O  >= Median (25,794)  0.386  7.97  2.832  7.23  0.582  11.17
b)  Pop9O  < Median  0.139  2.25  0.561  1.38  0.316  4.69
4)  Ethnic heterogeneity
a)  Ethnic90 >= Median (0.20)  0.328  6.09  2.628  5.42  0.580  9.94
b)  Ethnic90 < Median  0.274  5.15  1.472  4.61  0.421  7.44
5)  Central vs. suburban cities  0.193  4.22  1.397  4.07  0.370  7.86
Includes dummies for central and suburban cities
6)  Population density  0.301  7.85  2.058  6.95  0.497  12.26
Controls  for log (population density)
7)  Percent voting for a Democrat President  0.222  5.85  1.409  5.18  0.445  10.63
Notes: The  table  reports  coefficients  on the  council-size  variable  as additional  controls  are  added  and  the sample  is split by
some  of  the right  hand  side  variables.  The  reported  t-statistics  use  White's  heteroskedasticity  consistent  covariance  matrix.
Baseline  estimates  refer  to the coefficients  in  table  3 corresponding  to the regressions  with  the  full set of  controls.
45Table 5: Endogeneity
Log (Expenditures  per capita)  Expenditure  share  Log (Govt.  employ
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)
Estimation  methodology  OLS  TSLS  OLS  TSLS  OLS  TSLS  OLS  TSLS  OLS  TSLS
Constant  -3.256  -3.267  -2.595  -2.594  -8.419  -8.505  -2.451  -2.466  -0.601  -0.603
-16.355  -16.382  -11.682  -11.659  -4.267  -5.861  -0.797  -1.487  -2.789  -2.786
Log (Council Size)  0.268  0.286  0.108  0.106  1.963  2.113  0.775  0.800  0.458  0.461
6.451  6.009  2.546  1.996  5.702  6.095  2.088  2.023  10.156  8.935
Log(Pop9O)  0.133  0.131  0.105  0.106  0.615  0.597  0.467  0.464  0.039  0.038
8.728  7.923  7.603  7.094  4.423  4.954  3.458  4.186  2.384  2.140
Ethnic  0.187  0.195  0.387  0.387  2.233  2.295  3.778  3.777  -0.020  -0.019
2.233  2.304  4.161  4.307  3.443  3.733  5.163  5.638  -0.211  -0.211
Income per capita  0.026  0.026  0.020  0.020  -0.101  -0.100  -0.124  -0.124  0.003  0.003
7.616  7.748  5.772  6.279  -5.628  -4.103  -6.234  -5.305  0.914  0.907
% BA Grad  -0.679  -0.679  -0.520  -0.520  -4.948  -4.950  -4.397  -4.395  -0.804  -0.804
-4.384  -4.272  -3.606  -3.713  -5.250  -4.281  -4.881  -4.214  -4.553  -4,647
Mean/Median  Income  0.574  0.571  0.838  0.838  5.060  5.037  6.623  6.620  1.416  1.416
5.980  5.968  8.829  9.717  7.439  7.228  9.901  10.300  12.931  13.615
State  dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No
No. of obs.  1514  1514  1514  1514  1514  1514  1514  1514  1516  1516
Adj. R-sq  0.157  0.156  0.424  0.424  0.192  0.192  0.422  0.422  0.193  0.193
S.E. of regression  0.484  0.484  0.400  0.400  3.521  3.522  2.979  2.979  0.525  0.525
Notes:  White's  heteroskedasticity  consistent  t-statistics  are  reported  below  coefficient  estimates.  Csize  is  instrumented  with  its  decade  earlier  value.
46Table  6: District,  At-large,  and  Mixed  Electoral  Systems
Log(exppc92)  Expsh92  Govemplpc92
Intercept  -3.006  -5.914  0.142
-15.75  -4.35  0.70
District  dummy  x District  councilmen  0.027  0.197  0.038
5.74  5.98  7.81
At-large  dummy  x  At-large  councilmen  0.034  0.284  0.039
5.47  6.39  5.82
Mixed  system  dummy  x District  councilmen  0.032  0.282  0.046
4.82  5.92  6.48
Mixed  system  dummy  xAt-large  councilmen  0.060  0.334  0.083
5.09  3.97  6.63
F-statsitic  21.212  22.502  29.665
p-value  0.00  0.00  0.00
No. of obs.  1972  1972  1977
Adj. R-sq  0.15  0.19  0.20
S.E. of regression  0.52  3.71  0.55
Note:  Regressions  includes  the  following  additional  variables:  Ethnic90,  1990  population,  Income  per  capita
in 1990,  % BA  Grad,  Mean-to-Median  income
47Table 7: At-Large and District Results by Sample
Sample  (By-district/Csize)  (At-large/Csize)
Sample  ~~~~~~~x  log(Csize)  x log(Csize)
Regressions  for log (Expenditures  per capita):
All  0.308  0.318
7.771  6.834
Mixed  electoral  systems  0.425  0.527
(some  at-large and some  by district)  5.185  6.159
Non-mixed  electoral  systems  0.209  0.221
(all at-large  or all by-district)  4.338  3.945
Regressions  for Expenditure  Share:
All  2.165  2.351
7.089  6.546
Mixed  electoral  systems  3.105  3.527
(some at-large  and some  by district)  4.458  5.324
Non-mixed  electoral systems  1.522  1.692
(all at-large  or all by-district)  4.156  3.972
Regressions  for log (Govt  employment per capita):
All  0.483  0.451
11.479  9.202
Mixed  electorai  systems  0.422  0.568
(some  at-large and some  by district)  4.902  6.464
Non-mixed  electoral systems  0.407  0.391
(all at-large  or all by-district)  8.129  6.717
Notes:  White's  heteroskedasticity  consistent  t-statistics  are  reported  below  coefficient
48Table 8:  Institutional Form of Goverment
Log  (Expenditures  per capita)  Expenditure  share  Log  (Govt. employment  p
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)
Constant  -2.583  -2,531  -2.585  -1.480  -0.667  -1.147  0.636  0.613
-6.531  -6.540  -6.557  -0.444  -0.200  -0.340  1.803  1.750
Log (Council  Size)  0.212  0.180  0.224  1.191  0.698  1.066  0.198  0.205
2.919  2.595  3.025  2.546  1.513  2.211  2.760  2.695
Mayorcouncil  0.308  0.234  1.342  2.070  0.056
1.793  0.956  1.084  1.218  0.316
Mayorcouncil  x Log(Csize)  -0.177  -0.154  -0.783  -1.322  -0.046
-2.026  -1.216  -1.209  -1.460  -0.519
Budgetm  -0.240  -0.294  -1.624  -2.136  -0.290
-1.097  -1.263  -1.053  -1.249  -1.273
Budgetm x Log(Csize)  0.117  0.157  0.735  1.087  0.161
1.132  1.417  0.959  1.277  1.533
Mayveto  0.541  0.410  2.053  0.915  0.446
2.635  1.739  1.348  0.566  2.228
Mayveto x Log(Csize)  -0.262  -0.182  -0.827  -0.142  -0.222
-2.544  -1.521  -1.072  -0.171  -2.231
Log(Pop9O)  0.092  0.092  0.088  0.236  0.232  0.201  0.042  0.040
6.046  6.103  5.768  1.707  1.700  1.453  2.657  2.549
Ethnic  0.469  0.470  0.467  4.096  4.110  4.089  0.315  0.320
4.312  4.332  4.299  5.331  5.327  5.316  2.926  2.976
No. of obs.  1420  1420  1420  1420  1420  1420  1418  1418
Adj.  R-sq  0.346  0.346  0.347  0.348  0.349  0.350  0.464  0.465
S.E. of regression  0.430  0.430  0.430  3.091  3.090  3.087  0.434  0.434
Notes:  White's heteroskedasticity  consistent  t-statistics  are reported  below  coefficient  estimates.
Regressions  include  a complete  list of state dummies.
Regressions  control  for  per capita  income,  educational  attainment  and ratio  of mean  to median  income.
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